Facts
Private respondent Somerado Malomalo Guro filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for Municipal Mayor of Lumbaca-Unayan, Lanao del Sur on October 16, 2015, stating under oath that he was a registered voter of Barangay Poblacion Dilausan. Petitioner Saripoden Ariman Guro, the incumbent mayor running for re-election, filed a Petition for Disqualification on April 29, 2016, alleging from the posted certified voters' list that private respondent was not a registered voter of the municipality. Private respondent answered that COMELEC had already approved his inclusion in the supplemental voters' list, that he voted, and that he won and was proclaimed Mayor in the May 2016 elections. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition as filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the COMELEC En Banc, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, affirmed on the same ground without passing on the merits.
Issue
Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed, solely on the ground of late filing, a petition to disqualify a mayoralty candidate for misrepresenting himself as a registered voter in his certificate of candidacy?
Ruling
No. Because the petition was grounded on private respondent's alleged ineligibility, it was in substance a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC under Section 78, governed by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, which required filing within 5 days from the last day for filing COCs but not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC assailed. Private respondent filed his COC on October 16, 2015, while petitioner filed only on April 29, 2016, "or after the lapse of a whopping one hundred ninety-six (196) days." The Court distinguished Aznar v. Commission on Elections and cases involving citizenship, an "overriding and fundamental desideratum matched perhaps only by disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines," from Loong v. Commission on Elections, where misrepresentation as to age did not warrant the same leniency, and from Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, Caballero v. Commission on Elections, and Ocate v. Commission on Elections, where delay was excused only because of a supervening event, peculiar circumstances, or a mere one-day lapse. Finding none of those circumstances present, the Court held "that the reglementary period provided by law should likewise be strictly applied to such a disqualification." The petition was accordingly DISMISSED, and the COMELEC En Banc Resolution affirming the First Division's dismissal was AFFIRMED.